GENERAL RIPPER:And thus, mes p'tits, do I give you the "FEMA Rap for Kidz." This sort of Hitlerjugend effort to acculturate children to their collective responsibility to the body politic is not without its self-parodic charms, and I'm surely not the sort who "considers the children," even those children who are our future. That said, there is something grotesque and monstrous about this perceived need to indoctrinate the youngest among us with an irrational belief in the ubiquity of catastrophe. I won't be the first to point out this irony at the heart of the teleology of the security state: on one hand, necessary dependence on the state as the sole defender from disaster; on the other hand, the total inevitability of disaster regardless. I may be a little more original when I suggest that without this central irony, the argument for the necessity of the state becomes rather weak. At the heart of justifications for state power, even modest, minarchical, secure-property-and-defend-the-borders libertarian justifications, is the proposition that disaster will befall you in the absence of a state agent with a capacity to act forcefully. You will be mugged and raped and murdered by some Hobbesian villain. You will die in a natural disaster. You will be invaded. If, conversely, you presume otherwise, then the protective necessity of monopolistic force seems less evident; indeed, it seems extraneous
Mandrake, do you realize that in addition to fluoridated water, why, there are studies underway to fluoridate salt, flour, fruit juices, soup, sugar, milk, ice cream? Ice cream, Mandrake. Children's ice cream?
MANDRAKE:
Good Lord.
-Dr. Strangelove
Wednesday, November 14, 2007
Defining our Terms
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
25 comments:
". . .cause disasters don't rest."
I was heartened yesterday when I went in for a parent-teacher-student conference for my 2d grader. The teacher explained their philosophy for teaching math. She expressly (and numerous times cause my wife just wasn't getting it), said they are not teaching rote memorization of math rules. She said that they (constructivist-teachers) don't want the students to mindless apply rules. They are interested in having the children understand the relationships between the numbers they are manipulating and from this manipulation develop a deeper understanding of what to do in specific addition, subtraction, etc. problems.
Prof.
I dunno. I think the necessity for a state is better examined through the issue of commons problems. Game theory suggests that in certain circumstances people will have little or no incentive to cooperate, even when that cooperation would result in a net benefit to all. The state, either as arbiter or decider, solves this dilemma. This idea ends up justifying the state and its monopoly on power (to a degree), but that's really beside the point. I can elaborate or give examples if this relatively complicated idea is not communicated through my judicious use of unexplained conclusions.
I find that argument to be weak, as I think I expressed. Firstly, you can't say that people will have "little or no incentive to cooperate" in the same breath as "even when cooperation will result in a net benefit to all." The argument is simply that in the absence of a state arbiter, people will not independently recognize what is to their own benefit, or their own collective benefit, as the case may be. And when you say that the state must arbitrate or decide, what you're really saying is that people must be coerced into making the decisions that are best for them. As an argument for the state, made from within the totality of the state, it is question begging. It presumes what it sets out to prove: namely, that in the absence of state coercion, people will behave not in their own benefit. Dubious, I say, especially given the record of the state at looking out for the "best interests" of anyone.
Firstly, you can't say that people will have "little or no incentive to cooperate" in the same breath as "even when cooperation will result in a net benefit to all.
Sure you can. Say there are 1000 people in a group and that a group member encounters a situation in which he has two choices, a) and b). Choice a) results in his pocketing $1000. Choice b) results in everyone in the group pocketing $2.
I'd say it's a pretty safe bet that a substantial number of people would choose a).
Just sayin'...
the_system
I regret repeating myself, but that is explicitly not making the case that there is no incentive. It is making the case that some party or other will not realize that there is an incentive. That's a categorically different proposition. The presumption that many people will choose personal enrichment rather than redistributive justice in the sorta-kinda Rawlsian sense of the word is not the same as saying that no incentive exists.
I quibble, in any case, with the presumption that this is the case. Waiters in restaurants voluntarily split tips even though it would easily benefit one or other more to cheat and pocket additional cash, just as one small example. What you're really saying is that people might not voluntarily set themselves up in a modern, redistributive liberal society if they were not born into it and unable to escape it. And indeed, that's probably true, but it's another example of presuming its own endeavored proof.
Not to point out the obvious, but rebutting the proposition that 'in the absence of state coercion, people will act against their [collective] interests' on grounds that states are generally bad at looking out for people's best interests is a logical fallacy.
I don't think that anyone made that argument.
Don't forget the ongoing fear of sex...if you have sex, you will die is a fairly safe summation of the cultural attitude towards carnal activity...
Sure, you say "especially given," as if it was icing on the cake, but isn't that really the main course right there?
The whole point of the commons dilemma is that there are two different incentive structures, one of which makes sense in an individual frame and one of which requires a population-level viewpoint. So your first objection is askew, as t_s pointed out: what the state is to enforce is attention to the collective incentive structure.
The second objection is more than a bit muddy: what does "an argument for the state, made from within the totality of the state" mean, anyway? Are you saying it assumes metaphysical collectivism as opposed to individualism? Not at all--commons arguments explicitly recognize both ways of seeing things, but give greater weight (in some areas) to population-level incentive structures. Unclear how you can deny that "In the absence of state coercion, people will behave not in their [collective] own benefit." Whatever the underlying thought is, it sounds utopian.
Anyway since the only evidence adduced was the poor "record of the state at looking out for the 'best interests' of anyone" I took that to be your refutation.
That's a very creative restatement of some argument or other. In any event, the dilemma that you point out also presumes its own conclusion: that the benefit of this or that collectivity supercedes the benefit of this or that putative member thereof, and that, I think, is an open question. Applied to states, the argument becomes, "If there were no state to arbitrate people's behavior, then people would not behave in a manner consistent with the ideal maintenance of the state." That's a truism, and I can't refute it. I just question why it is that you, or anyone, assumes acting in such a manner to be morally or ethically preferable to otherwise. That's hardly a utopic idea. You will nowhere find me arguing that the chance of, say, random violence against a randomly selected individual's life or property will decrease in the absence of a state structure. In fact, I suspect it would increase. Again, I am only questioning whether or not the advent of such eventuality would be less desirable than, say, a nation with 10,000 nuclear warheads, or for that matter a few camps with gas chambers.
I think you also rest your objections on the fallacious notion that the state, which is after all an abstracted ideation of collective will or sovereign will or what have you, will even under the best circumstances act to the supposed collective benefit. I am not using that as a rebuttal, by the way, but as a grounds for inquiry. Even supposing the most charitable reading of a liberal democratic social contract in which the state is the express will of the consentually governed--itself a fairly naive proposition--the argument here is hardly more sophisticated than "two heads is better than one." But the "wisdom of crowds" folks, or the philosophers of a liberal democratic order, have never, to my knowledge, convincingly explained how it is that ten people in a truly voluntary association--or simply ten people thrown together by the randomnest of chance will--will all act, to use my own term, as Hobbesian villains, robbing and killing and cheating until only one is left holding, as it were, the whole pie, whereas three hundred million people will . . . not. Obviously the argument isn't simply one of scale. No one supposes that a city of 10 million is necessarily more fair, just, safe, or beneficial than a town of 10,000 or an unincorporated village of ten families. Indeed, the opposite is usually presumed: that the smaller social group with the more voluntary association is a juster human arrangement. Until, of course, you suggest that one consider an even further devolution, at which point everyone throws up their hands and revises their argument back to the idea that if we were each left to our own devices, we'd all be Hannibal Lector meets Jesse James.
Good times, good times. The premise is not that "the benefit of this or that collectivity super[s]edes the benefit of this or that putative member thereof" as a matter of principle, the premise is that there are quite a few circumstances where--for structural reasons--individually oriented carrots and sticks just don't work out very well. Right? I believe water table is a classic example.
Anyhoo, applied to states, the argument becomes, "If there were no state to arbitrate people's behavior, then people would not behave in a manner consistent with maximizing collective interests." Not a truism. Your point I guess is ontological: that collectivities are not obvious, and that thinking in terms of collectivities is a prerequisite for states. Sure, I guess. Not that there's anything wrong with that.
Liberal democracy, who knows. I think this is a more basic debate. The problem is that humans are both social and self-interested, at once individual actors and members of an ecology. The question is how to make sure that both sets of interests get served. The state in these terms is just a mechanism to address population-level interests.
The debate about large versus small systems of governance is basically a question of spheres of jurisdiction. Don't you think? It seems weird to say that because the U.S. Federal government is a goofy (/sinister) mechanism for teaching kids what to do in an earthquake, one doesn't need a state-like entity to adjudicate riparian rights.
I am not sure the case of waiter's splitting tips under the supervision of management and with the possibility of being caught says much about anything.
In the next day or so I'll draw out a game table at my place, with numbers an' shit, and you can start explaining why I am wrong at that point. This will let us skip the conjecture about what I'm really saying.
oh noes, he wrote ecology. the eyes glaze.
through it all, I've managed to survive. sigh. I know, right?
speaking of ironical: I am more likely to be killed in an automobile accident than by anything "we" spend trillions of dollars on "stopping." and right, like I gave my consent by being born here. fuck, dad: why not Paris? somewhere tropical? New Zealand I hear is beautiful. as a sperm I was highly anti-authoritarian. but the fervor and excitement of the herd swept me along and before I knew it: poof, here I am.
and imagine: I've smoked pot, and I'm not addicted to harder drugs. and imagine: I've viewed some porn, and not raped anyone. and even imagine: I've sped on a roadway without a seatbelt and not killed anyone, including myself. and ridden my bike for hours upon hours, without a helmet. I eat broccoli, by choice. take that! trans fat has ruled my world.
we Americuns are hyperbolic when it comes to the childrun.
and Msr. is cheating.
what I want to know is, when will I be harvested?
(oh, awesome article on the tragedy of the commons. here)
Game theory suggests that in certain circumstances people will have little or no incentive to cooperate, even when that cooperation would result in a net benefit to all.
This is true. However, those "certain circumstances" in game theory -- the circumstances of the prisoner's dilemma and related games -- all assume that the people in question cannot communicate.
When people can communicate, they can overcome problems of commons without coercing each other. Game theory has nothing to say about such games.
Another way in which problems of commons can be dealt with even in the absence of effective communication is if the game is iterated. The iterated prisoner's dilemma has a "good" optimum strategy: tit for tat. Only a non-iterated game has the "bad" best strategy.
I submit to you that most problems in which the state is supposed by its apologists to be forcing people to cooperate, either allow for communication or are recurrent, such that "tit for tat" type strategies can create voluntary solutions.
The main exception is "conquest by another state". That's not iterated -- if it happens once, you lose the "game". (Communication is theoretically possible; it remains open as to whether a good solution could be negotiated in a nation of millions.)
Leonard, it's simply not true that communication or tit-for-tat solves all commons problems. I'll write a full post on it in the next few days.
Busted!
Not sure that you'd call that cheating though. Geez, what a tough crowd.
I always love the argument that humans are incapable of x (resolving disputes peacefully; allocating public goods fairly; planning for the future; building anything more advanced than a daub and wattle hut) without a hierarchy of governors to help them. The enthymeme - that the folks who govern us, therefore, aren't human - proves my point better than I could.
"That's okay; no one's human," as Gerald Ford said to Adrian Veidt.
Thank you, ultima, for being you.
Ultima, to be clear, I've made no such argument. Humans are incapable of solving some problems. Where we go from there is another matter.
Frog, there's a difference between strategies in game theory, and solutions that can work in the real world of mushy humans. Game theory must deal with the possible, not the actual or the likely. For example it is very unlikely to get a million people to agree to anything, communication allowed or not. But it is possible, in theory at least, and thus you cannot rule out a communication strategy in game theory if communication is possible.
But when people then go spouting off how game theory -- a branch of mathematics, and thus objective truth, in a sense -- "proves" a need for the state, that's when they need smacked down. No, you don't get the imprimateur of truth for your twisted state. The justification for welfare, the necessity of mass warfare, and the virtues of genocide: all must be found in places other than mathematics, thankyouverymuch.
Your first graph actually works against you, Leonard, perhaps you see that. Perhaps not.
The second paragraph is hopeful projection. If you are going to answer your own questions I find it best to keep the whole conversation within the boundaries of your own head.
I don't see that it works against me, but then I don't particularly care and it does not matter anyway. It works against you, and that's the point. I'm not the one claiming a mathematical justification for my cherished ideology.
(math is a pagan religion.)
Crispin deserves credit for wading through that Hobbes shit. yuck.
and I was just finished with the section you're channeling here, so it was ringing all sorts of bells.
as for the rest of you, you can theorize all you want about how people should "organize" or whatever, come to all sorts of ideations of justice and fairness and equity and equitable distribution of resources whathaveyou blah blah...but what I want to know is, would it be possible to do so without all the guns and shit? why not? (oh god, I'm dead aren't I?)
It's not that they're figuring out how to protect themselves; it's that they're working rationally on the problem of how to achieve maximum rapine and sack.
When the Khmer Rouge starts stacking skulls, they do so by the will of the people whose skulls they stack.
But anarchism is mindful destruction. It is precisely its refusal to shape and impose a future that distinguishes anarchism from ideologies: we want to let people go, and see what happens. In an existential or cosmic sense, I would say, that is the actual situation: we've been let go down here and what is happening is happening. But it's precisely in the attempt to seize control of the future that we have been about the busy work of destroying one another.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fb22mvWavsc&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tN2gpRcFKAQ&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u5kiz7GhJt0&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qf_LWq88H5I&feature=related
shit
click "watch this"
Post a Comment