What you have to understand about the rise of totalitarian/proto-fascist Russia--potentially a world disaster--is that it has all been driven by Chechnya. In a way, this could have been a remote, obscure independence movement. But Yeltsin tried to put his foot down: it was the almost-arbitrary point at which he decided to stop his empire disintegrating.
~Crispin Sartwell~
This is the kind of stuff that happens when the war on terror is used as an excuse to circumvent our civil liberties, which has become the hallmark of the Bush administration.
~Jack Cafferty~
9/11 changed everything.
~Everyone and his mother~
Jack Cafferty is right in the general sense and wrong in the specific. The error is in the phrasing. The "when" clause implies an exclusion that doesn't exist. It suggests a possible, parallel "war on terror" that exists as something other than an "excuse to circumvent our civil liberties." The phrase following the comma identifying such abuses as "the hallmark of the Bush administration" makes a similar implication: that in the hands of some other president, some other government, such a backwards-day "war" might well exist. But it wouldn't. It couldn't. The "when" is always. The "war on terror" is an arbitrary designation crafted specifically and intentionally to make palatable--to make desirable--a parcel of authoritarian practices at home and abroad.
Crispin Sartwell goes on to say this about Russia in Chechnya:
the russian army, the russian nation, and the russian president were humiliated there in the way a tiny, fierce, cohesive people can humiliate a decaying empire.
Humility isn't a valued trait in an empire. The natural and practical limits of power don't command proper respect, but rather provide affronts to an esteem founded on a falsely masculine military pride. Russia
was humiliated in Chechnya, just as its predecessing Soviet Union was humiliated in Afghanistan, just as America and France before were humiliated in Vietnam. Vietnam survived beause after killing millions and losing tens of thousands of its own, the United States hadn't the stomach or the monies to continue killing. Afghanistan survived, but just barely. War with the USSR exhausted it. The resulting internal strife enervated it further. War with the United States continued the demolition. The peoples of Afghanistan--most of them, anyway--will survive, but any sort of unitary political future is doubtful. Chechnya--the nation, the people, the culture--will probably disappear.
Let's talk about America, though. The humiliation of Vietnam and the economic turmoil of the few years following was sufficient to tamp down momentarily the national enthusiasm for imperial adventurism, but the governing class, purged by practice and propaganda of any significant dissent to the view that America held a "special place" in the world that not only excused but required intevention in affairs far beyond its own borders--euphemized as "democratization" or "spreading democracy"--would never allow a return to "isolationist" sentiments. Luckily everyone loves a parade. Or a minor intervention in a harmless nation. The Reagan years, "morning in America," were basically a stage test for a resurgent American militarism. Publicly, soft targets were chosen--Grenada; Noriega. There were hiccups. Beirut. Public revelation of those South American interventions not designed for popular consumption. But whatever else can be said about Reagan's presidency, it's clear that he left office having presided over the reinvigoration of popular militarism. America could "walk proud" or "stand tall" again. Under George H.W. Bush, Saddam Hussein, a long-time client-dictator of ours, launched a miscalculated occupation of neighboring Kuwait, which let the United States launch a video-game air war against a nation much-weakened by its 8-year conflict with Iran--a conflict encouraged, armed, and funded on both sides by the United States.
Acceptable militarism alone is not sufficient grounds for the full implementation of authoritarianism at home, though. That requires a more pernicious enemy. It requires fear. It requires humiliation. The examples of terrorism under Carter and Reagan didn't occur within the United States, and didn't serve the necessary purpose.
It was during Bill Clinton's tenure that we witnessed the twin narratives of internal enemies and national humiliation at the hands of terrorists. In February of 1993, the World Trade Center was bombed for the first time, killing six and injuring over a thousand. One of the principle architects of that attack, Ramzi Youssef, had been living in the United States for a year. In foreign policy circles, "radical Islam" and "al-Qaeda" and other now-familiar buzzwords began circulating. A little over two years later, in 1996, Timothy McVeigh and "others unknown" successfully bombed the Oklahoma City Federal Building, ostensibly to mark the anniversary of the US Government's disastrous and deadly raid on the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, TX. Bill Clinton wagged his finger at the cameras: "You cannot say you love your country and hate its government." There was a brief flurry of interest in "militias" and "survivalists," but the simmering, lasting belief that wafted out of the ashes was that whether Muslims or some "patriot movement," there lurked within America an internal enemy that our military might alone could not adequately combat. In 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which created new statutory limits on the application and protections of habeas corpus--limitations later firmed and expanded with the passage of the PATRIOT Act and, most recently, by the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
The more recent history is more familiar. In September, 2001, the World Trade Centers were destroyed by hijacked airliners. President Bush declared a "war on terror." Patsies like Andrew Sullivan and a broad clique of mainstream authors and pseudo-intellectuals began to fulminate about "enemies within" and "fifth columns." Conversations about "balancing freedom and security" arose with increasing frequency, and with a few exceptions it was roundly accepted across the deep-but-narrow political spectrum that certain "sacrifices" had to be made in a "new era" of "security concerns." This is a familiar theme. One doesn't have to be a conspiracy theorist to understand the signifacance of these certain strokes of luck for the many advocates of powerful government. Martin Van der Lubbe, after all, did start a fire, and really was a communist.
If there has been a recent impediment to the continued building of American militarism and domestic authoritarianism, it's been the main spokesman himself, who is too hollow and who speaks too poorly for the job. George W. Bush was a one-hit wonder, and despite the mighty efforts of the legislative branch in this country to confer on him the mandate of heaven, he has faltered right along with imperial policy, proving neither slick nor adaptive enough to keep the people tuned into the show. Now Sartwell says:
At any rate, I vibe the us turning away [from nascent authoritarianism], though the consolidations of executive power will hardly be reversed.
I'm less sanguine. Whoever takes up the pot of "political capital" at the end of the rainbow in 2008 will have in his hands a police mechanism of extraordinary breadth, power, and complexity, as well as a national culture of soldier-worship that, despite the stumblings of "the mission," has only increased in the past months, as the patriotic fervor once directed at The Decider is transferred to The Troops. Both Iraq and Afghanistan are completely beyond our control at this point, but those facts have yet to fully penetrate the national awareness. Even as majorities say they support "withdrawal," it remains clear that commensurate majorities don't understand what "defeat" in Iraq or Afghanistan means to the imperial project that they tacitly support, even though the naming of it remains anathema. Potential conflicts with Iran and Syria are worrying enough, but I fear the spasms of violence this country may be capable of if, two years hence, our Middle-Eastern adventures lie in further ruins and a new executive, unburdened by past administrative failures, takes up the sceptor and seats himself on the throne.
UPDATE: See James in comments for a couple of factual corrections.